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Abstract  This project investigates the impact of geographically-targeted Federal tax 
relief enacted in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  To facilitate administration of 
relief efforts and define eligibility for the temporary tax law changes, the Gulf 
Opportunity Zone (GO Zone) was created.  We estimate the initial impacts of these tax 
incentives using propensity score matching (PSM) and Mahalanobis metric matching 
(MM) methods, combined with difference-in-difference (DD) estimation, to limit the 
confounding influences of observable and fixed unobservable differences between 
counties affected by these incentives and similarly storm-damaged counties in the region 
that were not included in the GO Zone.  Results show that per capita personal income and 
net earnings increased more rapidly in GO Zone counties that experienced minimal storm 
damage than in similar non-GO Zone counties in the GO Zone States and neighboring 
States. 
 Introduction 
   The 2005 Atlantic Hurricane season will go down on record as a one of the most 
costly and deadly in US history.
1  Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma together were 
responsible for over 2000 deaths and more than $150 billion worth of damage (NOAA 
2005; NOAA 2008).  The primary victims of the hurricanes were the Gulf Coast and 
South Florida.  In the Gulf Coast, a quarter of a million people were uprooted from their 
homes and communities, and nearly six years later, many have not yet returned.  In the 
wake of the disasters, the Federal government, along with State and local governments 
were tasked with helping the region recover.  Housing assistance was provided through 
the US Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA); income support following the loss of a job was provided 
by expanded unemployment insurance
2 and Disaster Unemployment Insurance (DUA); 
health care assistance could be obtained through Medicaid; and short-term cash 
assistance was available from Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
program (Winston et al. 2007).  All of these are familiar programs and represent orthodox 
approaches to helping those who need relief, though not necessarily need arising due to 
natural disaster. 
  In what was considered to be a less orthodox means of providing disaster relief, 
Congress quickly enacted geographically targeted tax relief through two legislative acts: 
The Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005
3 (KETRA) and the Gulf Opportunity 
                                                 
1The ―Great Galveston Hurricane‖ in 1900 had a death toll of 8,000 (NOAA 2007). 
2 The Hurricane Katrina Unemployment Relief Act of 2005 allocated  $500 million in UI benefits from the 
Federal unemployment account, to be divided among LA, MS, and AL (Winston 2007). 
3 H.R. 3768 was introduced on September 14, 2005, passed on September 15, signed into law on September 
23, and became Public Law No:109-73. 1 
 
Zone Act of 2005 (GOZA).
4  KETRA provided tax relief primarily to taxpayers through a 
combination of exclusions, deductions, and credits; penalty free distributions or loans 
from retirement accounts or other qualified saving plans; and special look-back rules for 
calculating certain credits.  KETRA also created an employee retention credit for 
employees affected by the hurricane, and classified certain individuals affected by the 
hurricane as a targeted group for the purposes of the work opportunity tax credit 
(WOTC). 
  GOZA provisions, on the other hand, were focused mainly on business activities 
in the Gulf region.
5 GOZA was predominantly made up of incentives for capital 
investment, for example, accelerated expensing and depreciation provisions.  GOZA 
created investment incentives by expanding the size and scope of tax exempt bond 
financing for private activities, and allocating New Markets Tax Credits (NMTCs) for 
qualified investment activity in the region. 
  To facilitate the relief, both laws created relief areas, established by geographic 
boundaries.  In some of the Acts‘ provisions, businesses or individuals were merely 
required to meet a residency test to be eligible for the tax relief, while in other cases, a 
taxpayer must have shown that they had incurred a loss or displacement due to the 
hurricane. 
  The Acts were a new and relatively untested means of providing relief in the wake 
of a natural disaster.  The Acts represented the first time the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) 
was used to provide broad relief after a natural disaster with so many victims, spread over 
                                                 
4 H.R. 4440 was introduced on December 6, 2005, signed into law on December 22, and became Public 
Law No. 109-135. 
5 Although GO Zone included most of the same individual relief and property transaction relief, it did so 
primarily in order to codify and extend them to the newly created Rita and Wilma Zones. 2 
 
hundreds of miles, many of whom having been displaced from their homes.  After the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the US Congress passed a set of tax relief packages 
targeted at the victims and their families, but they were more limited in scope, and the 
victims and regional economic circumstances differed in important ways (Joint 
Committee on Taxation 2005b).
6  Further, the cost of the tax laws was not trivial.  It was 
estimated that KETRA would cost $3.3 billion in the first year, TY 2006 (Joint 
Committee on Taxation 2005a).  The cost of the tax expenditures in GOZA was 
estimated to be $3.95 billion in the first year, tax year 2006, and $8.67 billion over ten 
years (Joint Committee on Taxation 2005c). 
  After six years, it remains to be seen whether the Acts had an effect on the 
recovery of the region.  In part, this is because it is quite difficult to disentangle the 
effects of each provision of the Acts, because rather than a single policy ―lever,‖ many 
rule changes were made, covering individuals and businesses.  Further, provisions in the 
Act were effective for different lengths of time or by actions taken during specific dates 
after the storm, and many provisions were extended beyond their sunset date, with some 
still in effect today.
7  Therefore, the objective of this research is to evaluate the impact of 
the totality of the law changes on measures of economic well-being of those covered by 
Acts.  The hurricane offers a unique natural experiment, and the tax Acts are well suited 
as policy shocks because they were enacted quickly in the wake of Hurricane Katina, thus 
taxpayers (individuals and businesses) did not have time to change their behavior prior to 
the passage of the laws in anticipation of new rules. 
                                                 
6 Congress passed two Acts following the 9/11 attacks: The Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 
and the Job Creation, and the Worker Assistance Act of 2002. 
7 As of April 22, 2011. 3 
 
  While the storm did not respect jurisdictional boundaries, the law‘s boundaries 
were clearly drawn and demarcated by county and state; as a result, some counties were 
not included in the law but nonetheless incurred damage due to the storm, particularly 
counties with low amounts of damage.  Using the boundaries of the GO Zone and storm 
damage data generated from FEMA risk analysis software, we create matched 
―treatment‖ and ―control‖ groups, covering counties in Mississippi, Louisiana, and 
Alabama, Tennessee, Arkansas.  The treatment group consists of counties within the GO 
Zone, and the control group consists of like-damaged counties—as measured by a loss 
ratio—outside of the GO Zone that were otherwise similar in their socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics. 
  Because we match counties by level of storm damage (as well as other factors), 
this inherently means that we are only able to investigate economic impacts of GO Zone 
designation on counties that suffered small impacts of the hurricanes—since all 
moderately and heavily damaged counties are included in the GO Zone.  And since many 
of the provisions of the KETRA and GO Zone Acts were targeted to assist households or 
businesses who suffered actual losses from the hurricanes, it less likely our approach will 
reflect the impact of those types of provisions.  Our approach is more likely to reflect the 
impact of provisions intended to promote investment and economic development in the 
entire GO Zone region, regardless of whether the beneficiaries had been damaged by 
hurricanes. Our analysis focuses on comparing aggregate economic outcomes between 
two groups.  As  such, we use a matching estimator to generate difference-in-differences 
estimates of the effect of the Acts on the rate of change in per-capita income and its 4 
 
major components (net earnings, receipt of interest, rents and dividends, and transfer 
payments), employment per capita, and population. 
 
Background 
  On the morning of August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in southern 
Plaquemines Parish Louisiana as a Category 3 hurricane.  Maximum winds were 
estimated to be 125 mph to the east of the center of the hurricane.  After landfall, the 
Hurricane followed a path north through the center of Mississippi.  As the storm moved 
inland, winds diminished, but peak wind gusts still exceeded 100 mph in much of 
Mississippi and counties along Alabama‘s western border. 
  Katrina took a large human toll, both in terms of deaths and through the uprooting 
of lives.  The estimated death toll was greater than 1,880, and the displacement, 
especially of residents of New Orleans, was estimated at 250,000.  The hurricane was 
also very destructive in terms of economic losses.  In August 2006, insurance industry 
estimates put the losses at approximately $60 billion (including flood damage), though 
some have estimated the storm could cost the Gulf Coast states as much as $125 billion 
(NOAA 2005). 
  Although Katrina received the bulk of the press—and for good reason—two other 
hurricanes, Rita and Wilma, would also make landfall in the southern United States.  
Hurricane Rita, a storm with a similar origin and track as Katrina was next to hit the Gulf 
Coast—though sparing South Florida by passing south through the Florida Keys.  On 
September 22
nd, Rita was a category 5 hurricane, and was making an ominous turn to the 
north toward the coast of Louisiana.  As President Bush was signing the Katrina 5 
 
Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (HR 3768), Hurricane Rita was churning in the Gulf 
of Mexico as a category 3, slightly more than 125 miles from the coast, and would make 
landfall at the Texas/Louisiana border, early the following day, before heading north 
through Eastern Texas and Northwestern Louisiana as a tropical depression.  It is 
estimated that 35 people died due to Rita, and it produced damages estimated at $16 




  Following the Hurricane, tax relief to victims of the 2005 Hurricane came 
primarily from two laws.
9  On September 23
rd, 2005, the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief 
Act of 2005 (KETRA) was signed by the President.  Later that year in December, 
Congress enacted more tax relief with the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (GOZA), 
which repealed and replaced several provisions in KETRA, but added many more, most 
of which were business-related.  Features of KETRA and GOZA disaster relief were 
similar, and in many cases identical, to those enacted after the terrorist attacks in New 
York.  Like the Liberty Zone in New York, they created geographic boundaries that were 
used to established eligibility for the tax provisions (Figure 1).   
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
  The Hurricane Katrina Disaster Area covers all areas that were declared a major 
disaster by the President because of Hurricane Katrina.  The Gulf Opportunity Zone (GO 
Zone), also known as the Core Disaster Area, is a subset of the Katrina Disaster Area, 
                                                 
8 We restrict the discussion to the GO Zone and Katrina disaster area, but many of the provisions below 
apply to the Rita and Wilma Zones. 
9 Some states made modifications to their tax codes to provide relief to their state‘s taxpayers. 6 
 
and covered counties that were deemed eligible for individual only or individual and 
public Federal Assistance under section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act (IRS 2006). 
Employment, Housing, and Income Support 
  Employment relief, as it was termed in the KETRA and codified in the IRC came 
in the form of credits to employers who retained workers or made it easier for workers to 
remain in their positions.  The Employee Retention Credit was provided to businesses 
that were rendered inoperable by the Hurricane and that otherwise retained their 
employees.  The provisions provided for a credit of 40% of the wages paid to an eligible 
retained employee living in the Katrina core disaster area, up to a max of $6,000 in 
wages.  Originally, the provision in KETRA covered employers of 200 or less employees, 
but the limit was removed by GOZA, and the credit ended on December 31
st, 2006. 
  The WOTC was expanded to create a new group of ―targeted‖ employees: Katrina 
victims.  The WOTC, like the retention credit noted above, allowed employers to take a 
credit worth 40% of wages paid, up to $6,000 per qualified employee.
10  The original date 
of expiration was August 27
th, 2007; however the provision was extended several times 
and finally expired on August 27
th, 2009.  GOZA also provided an incentive for 
employers to provide lodging.  Employees who accepted the offer of lodging were 
allowed to exclude up to $600 of the value of the lodging from their gross income,
11 and 
employers were allowed a credit for 30% value of the excluded amount. 
  KETRA created rules allowing residents of the Katrina disaster area who 
sustained economic losses due to Katrina to supplement their income through the use of 
                                                 
10 A qualified employee is someone who lived in the GO Zone when the Hurricane struck. 
11 The value of employer-provided lodging still applies for purposes of calculating Social Security and 
Medicare taxes, as well as the unemployment tax. 7 
 
their retirement accounts and other specialized tax-favored accounts, 401(k), 403(b), or 
governmental 457 plan.
12  The provision allowed individuals to take distributions of up 
$100,000 from a qualified plan, increasing the limit from the previous $50,000.  
Distributions could be taken without incurring a penalty that would normally accompany 
an ―unqualified‖ distribution, which is generally a distribution taken before age 59½ or 
not due to death or disability.  Further, rules allowed these distributions to be re-
contributed to an eligible plan made in the subsequent three-year period following a 
distribution and treat the contribution as a rollover, thus not includible in gross income.  
In lieu of a roll-over, taxpayers could elect to include the qualified distribution in income 
ratably over a three year period, reducing the tax burden of such a distribution in any one 
year.  For the purposes of this provision, victims of Hurricane Katrina were permitted to 
take distributions between August 25
th, 2005 and January 1
st, 2007. 
  Low income residents benefited from a special look-back rule for determining 
earned income.  Residents of the GO Zone or residents or Katrina Disaster Area were 
permitted to use the previous year‘s earned income when determining the earned income 
tax credit or refundable child tax credit for tax year 2005, if the earned income from the 
previous year was less than that of the taxable year that included September 23, 2005.
  One of the larger (in dollar terms) provisions was the suspension of certain limits 
on personal casualty losses—$2.4 billion according to the Joint Committee on Taxation 
(2005a).  The provision allowed taxpayers in the Katrina Disaster Area to take a 
deduction for a loss that was not compensated by insurance even if it did not pass the 
$100 loss threshold or the aggregate of losses did not exceed 10% of the taxpayer‘s AGI. 
                                                 
12 GO Zone expanded the provision to victims of Hurricanes Rita and Wilma, codified in IRC section 
1400Q. 8 
 
  KETRA also provided a modification to a rule that extended the period of 
replacement for the non-recognition of a gain from an involuntary conversion of 
property, for example if a resident of the GO Zone received an insurance payment due to 
damage or loss from the Hurricane.  Under the modification, the resident had up to five 
years to replace the property if it was used in the Katrina Disaster Area.  If the taxpayer 
made the qualified investment, the gain, if there was any, did not have to be recognized at 
the time of the conversion.  Like the suspension of limits on casualty losses, the cost of 
this provision was relatively large, approximately $2.1 billion. 
Tax-advantaged Financing 
  Under GOZA, Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, and their respective political 
subdivisions were authorized to issue new debt to finance government functions or 
service outstanding government debt in the GO Zone.  Early estimates of the aggregate 
volume of new bonds—whether private-activity bonds or advance refunding bonds—was 
in the range of $23 billion (Sigo and DeSue 2006).  In addition, certain qualified private 
activities with a public goods component such as transportation facilities, residential 
rental property that serves low-income residents, or privately owned utility facilities, 
could also be financed through tax-exempt bonds, and in this case, the state or local 
jurisdiction serves as a conduit between investors and private activities.  The benefits of 
tax-exempt financing are clear: Perspective bond holders are willing to accept a lower 
interest rate if they can exclude from gross income the interest earned on the bonds, all 
else equal. 
  Included in the tax-advantaged financing were mortgage revenue bonds, which 
helped to finance home purchases, or make repairs and home improvements, through 9 
 
special rules for mortgage revenue bonds, which exempts interests on State or local 
bonds, if the bonds were used to finance mortgages for home purchases in the GO Zone, 
or to make repairs to an existing home. 
  In addition to tax-exempt bonds, GOZA created a new category of tax credit 
bonds called Gulf Tax Credit Bonds (GTCBs).  Unlike tax-exempt bonds, which pay 
interest that is excluded from gross income for tax purposes, tax credit bonds do not pay 
interest—rather they allow the bond holder to take a tax credit in lieu of an interest 
payment.  The tax credit is determined by a credit rate multiplied by the bond‘s face 
value, and the credit rate is set by the Secretary of the Treasury.  The volume of tax credit 
bonds issued was $350 million, much smaller than the volume of tax-exempt bonds, and 
the GTCBs were only issued to refund outstanding bonds or to provide loans to 
jurisdictions to service outstanding debt (Maguire 2008).  The ten-year estimated cost to 
the treasury of the bond provisions was approximately $2.4 billion (Joint Committee on 
Taxation 2005c).  
Investment Incentives 
  Several provisions of the tax relief regarding business expenses, acquisition of 
capital, and treatment of certain losses were also given increased tax advantages, 
effectively lowering the owner‘s cost of doing business.  Certain Gulf Zone property was 
eligible for a first-year depreciation deduction worth 50% of the adjusted basis of the 
property if a business invested in tangible property in the GO Zone where ―substantially 
all of the use of which is in the Gulf Opportunity Zone and is in the active conduct of a 
trade or business by the taxpayer in that Zone‖ (JCT 2005).  Furthermore, the definition 10 
 
of tangible property included certain nonresidential real property and residential rental 
property. 
  As another incentive to invest in other tangible property in the GO Zone (as 
opposed to real property, e.g., land or permanent structures), businesses were allowed to 
take an increased expensing deduction in lieu of depreciation.  If a business chose to 
expense the investment, it was previously limited to $100,000 by Section 179 of the IRC.
 
13  However, GOZA codified the provision to allow for up to an additional $100,000 
deduction, if the investment was made in a qualified section 179 GO Zone property, and 
the Treasury was granted authority to extend bonus depreciation placed-in-service dates 
on a case-by-case basis. 
  GOZA also granted a total of $700 million in additional New Markets Tax Credits 
to be allocated for investments in the GO Zone from the date of the Hurricane through 
2006.  The New Market Tax Credit was first introduced in the Community Renewal Tax 
Relief of 2000, and is structured so that taxpayers who make qualified equity investments 
in a Community Development Entity (CDE) may claim non-refundable credits worth up 
to 39% of the cost of their investment (Marples 2007).  To qualify for an allocation of 
credits, the CDE must demonstrate that it serves low-income communities either through 
lending, investments in other CDEs, or through financial counseling.  The allocation of 
New Market Tax Credits was estimated to cost the Treasury $387 million over 10 years. 
Other Recovery Efforts 
  The responsibility to remove debris from the Hurricane and demolish damaged 
structure was in many cases that of private citizens.  Under then-present law, the costs of 
debris removal generally was either capitalized into the basis of the land the property was 
                                                 
13 Indexed for inflation beginning in 2003. 11 
 
attached to or expensed in the present year, depending on their nature.
14  If the property 
was held for business or trade, or used to produce income, a provision in GOZA allowed 
for generous expensing of demolition and clean-up costs that would otherwise be charged 
to the business‘s capital account.  The provision allowed for a deduction of 50% of the 
cost, with the remainder being capitalized. 
  Tax-advantaged expensing of environmental remediation costs to clean up 
hazardous waste was extended to costs related to the clean-up of qualified contaminated 
sites in the GO Zone to include sites contaminated with petroleum products, which under 
present law, are not included.  In cases where taxpayers in the GO Zone had net operating 
losses (NOL), such taxpayers could take advantage of the extension of the NOL 
carryback rule to five years for amounts related to casualty losses, housing or moving 
expenses, depreciation of GO Zone property, and repair expenses. 
  The Southern United States is a major producer of domestic timber, growing a 
combination of hardwoods and softwoods, and millions of acres of timber were 
vulnerable to partial or total loss.  As a result of Hurricane Katrina, high winds took a 
large toll on the timber industry in the Gulf Region.  The USDA‘s Forest Service 
estimated 4.2 billion cubic feet (19 million board feet) of timber was lost in an area 
spread over 5 million acres covering Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana (USDA 2005). 
To assist with recovery of the industry, changes were made to the IRC to promote 
reforestation.
15  Under then-present law, $10,000 of reforestation expenditures could be 
expensed in a single tax year.  Under GOZA, owners of timber holdings that were 
                                                 
14 Some costs associated with debris removal may be considered as the cost of doing normal business and 
are thus deductible; however, if clean-up costs also involve demolition and  replacement of property, it may 
be appropriate to capitalize the cost. 
15 Rules for expensing and the five-year net operating loss carryback covered taxpayers who held 500 acres 
or less of timber property. 12 
 
damaged due to Katrina and were in the GO Zone were permitted to double their 
reforestation expense deduction.  To further assist with the damaging winds, net 
operating losses (NOLs) associated with timber holders were allowed to be carried-back 
five years, as opposed to the previous two years under present law Section 172. 
  KETRA created and GOZA codified and expanded an allowance for a suspension 
of limitations on charitable gifts, for both individual and corporate donors, ostensibly 
promoting charitable giving to organizations providing assistance to Katrina victims, 
particularly those who would have been limited by the existing contribution limit.  
However, only in the case of corporations were the contributions required to be for relief 
efforts to Hurricane Katrina. 
  Table 1 provides a summary of the major provisions of KETRA and GOZA, as 
well as the covered area, additional eligibility rules, and expiration dates of the 
provisions. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Econometric approach 
  A basic challenge in empirically assessing the impacts of a policy is that we do 
not observe the counterfactual situation; i.e., what would have happened to the parties 
affected by the policy (the ―treated‖ group) in the absence of the policy.  When random 
assignment is not possible, as in the present case, some method of estimating the 
counterfactual outcomes is necessary.  Commonly used methods of ex post economic 
impact evaluation include multiple regression analysis, difference-in-difference (DD) 
estimation, and quasi-experimental matching methods (Ravallion 2008).   13 
 
These approaches have different strengths and weaknesses.  Parametric regression 
models provide the most efficient estimator if the parametric assumptions are correct.  
However, these models can give biased results if the parametric assumptions are violated 
or if factors associated with both the incidence of the policy (or other explanatory 
variables) and outcomes are excluded from the model.  Matching methods avoid 
dependence on parametric assumptions about how the policy and other factors affect 
outcomes; as long as there are sufficient numbers of good matches in the unaffected 
group for each observation in the group affected by the policy, matching can produce 
valid impact estimates regardless of the true relationship between observed variables and 
outcomes.  However, like regression methods, these methods are sensitive to omission of 
relevant factors jointly associated with policy incidence and outcomes. DD estimation 
addresses the problem of unobserved confounding factors by subtracting out initial mean 
differences between the participant and non-participant groups.  This approach is 
effective if the confounding factors are fixed over time or have the same additive impact 
on both groups, since the effects of these factors will be subtracted out (whether or not 
such confounding factors are observed).  However, DD estimation does not address 
differences that may arise if the two groups were experiencing different trends in 
outcome variables even before the program.  
Using combinations of these methods can help to address the limitations of 
individual methods, resulting in more robust conclusions (Ravallion 2008).  For example, 
combining matching with DD estimation can help to reduce biases associated with 
observable differences between treated and untreated populations (using matching), and 
the effects of observable or unobservable fixed factors or common trends (using DD).  14 
 
Conditional DD estimators, some of which combine propensity score matching (PSM) 
with DD estimation, have been shown to reduce the bias of simple DD and matching 
estimators in studies using randomized groups to produce unbiased benchmark estimates 
of impact (Heckman, et al. 1998; Smith and Todd 2005). 
  For these reasons, we combine matching and DD estimation in our analysis of the 
economic impacts of GO Zones.  We compare mean differences in outcome variables 
from pre- to post GO Zone policy changes between matched GO Zone counties and non-
GO Zone counties.  We use either PSM or Mahalanobis metric (MM) matching methods 
to select the comparison groups.
16   
Each of these matching approaches has strengths and weaknesses.  A major 
strength of PSM is that matching on the propensity score is sufficient to estimate the 
average treatment effect, provided that the assumption of ―unconfoundedness‖ holds and 
sufficient overlap exists between the propensity scores of the treatment and control 
groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).
17   There is no theorem comparable to that of 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) providing a theoretical justification for the MM method, 
and MM often is more biased (due to differences in mean values of XT and XC in 
matched samples) than PSM, especially when a large number of covariates are involved 
(Gu and Rosenbaum 1993; Zhao 2004). 
                                                 
16 PSM matches treatment and control observations using the propensity score as the measure of distance 
between observations. The propensity score is the probability of being in the treatment group conditional 
upon observed covariates (p(X)).  MM matches treatment and control observations by minimizing the 
distance function dTC = (XT – XC)
‘ ∑
-1 (XT – XC), where XT and XC are vectors of matching variables for the 
treatment and potential control observations (considering all possible controls, and not only matched ones), 
and ∑ is the variance-covariance matrix of XC. 
17 The ―unconfoundedness‖ assumption is the assumption that the counterfactual outcome that would have 
occurred without the treatment is independent of treatment status, conditional upon the observed covariates 
(X). The overlap assumption is the assumption that 0 < p(X) < 1, which ensures that there are members of 
the comparison group for both treated and untreated units of observation. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
proved that under these assumptions, comparing groups that match in terms of p(X) is sufficient to ensure 
that they match in terms of individual covariates X, and that the comparison yields the average treatment 
effect. 15 
 
Nevertheless, the MM estimator often has lower standard errors than the PSM 
estimator and in many cases lower mean squared error, despite being more biased (Zhao 
2004).  Another advantage of the MM estimators that the estimated standard errors for 
MM are asymptotically consistent, provided that the bias resulting from imperfect 
matching on covariates is corrected (Abadie and Imbens 2006).
18  To address the bias, we 
use the MM version of the matching estimator developed by Abadie, et al. (2004), which 
corrects the bias using auxiliary least squares regressions of the outcome on the 
covariates for the matched control observations.
19   
For PSM, the estimated standard errors are not valid, both because of imperfect 
matching and because the estimated standard errors do not account for the fact that the 
propensity scores are estimated in a first stage estimation.  We use bootstrapping to 
estimate the standard errors for the PSM estimator. 
We use nearest neighbor PSM without replacement, which yielded better matches 
than PSM with replacement.
20  The comparison non-GO zone counties were selected 
from the three GO Zone States – AL, LA and MS – and from three neighboring states – 
AR, TN, and GA.  We restricted the set of possible comparison counties to counties from 
GO Zone and neighboring states in order to limit the potential confounding influence of 
                                                 
18 Abadie and Imbens (2006) proved the consistency and asymptotic normality of a class of bias-corrected 
covariate matching estimators that includes the Mahalanobis metric as a special case (Ibid., footnote 4, p. 
239).   
19 Formally, Abadie, et al. (2004) estimate the counterfactual outcome for each treated observation i (Yoi) 
as:  
Yoi = (1/#m(i)) ∑kЄm(i){Yok + μo(Xi) - μo(Xk)}, where m(i) is the set of matched control observations to 
treated observation i, #m(i) is the number of matched observations in this set, Yok is the outcome of 
matched control observation k (within m(i)), and μo(X) is the estimated linear regression function of the 
outcome on the covariates within the matched control group.  The terms μo(Xi) - μo(Xk) correct the 
estimated counterfactual outcome for differences resulting from differences in the values of the covariates 
between the treated (Xi) and matched control observations (Xk).    
20 We also investigated use of kernel PSM, but this resulted in even fewer treated observations that satisfied 
the common support requirement.  We do not report those results, although they were qualitatively similar 
to the results reported here.  Results available from the authors upon request. 16 
 
differing historical, demographic, socioeconomic and policy contexts.  Although the 
contexts are similar in these neighboring states, differences across states still may 
confound our results. Hence, in one variant of the PSM model, we include state level 
fixed effects and restrict the model to the three GO Zone states. This resulted in 
substantially fewer non-GO Zone counties in the analysis – reducing the number from 
444 to 116 non-GO Zone counties – and poorer matches and larger standard errors.  
Nevertheless, we include this analysis to investigate the robustness of our findings to 
such variation, and helping to rule out unobserved differences across states in 
confounding factors as a possible explanation for our results. We also investigate 
robustness to the matching method, using nearest neighbor MM, with replacement.
21  The 
MM estimator resulted in larger biases than PSM, which were corrected using auxiliary 
regressions as noted previously.   
Our matching procedures impose the ―common support‖ requirement, which 
drops treated observations with estimated propensity scores above the maximum 
propensity score in the control group, to avoid comparing observations that were poorly 
matched.  This requirement resulted in dropping 52 GO Zone counties from the analysis, 
leaving 43 GO Zone counties in the matched samples.
22  The most significant difference 
between the GO Zone counties that were dropped and those retained was the estimated 
loss ratio due to Hurricane Katrina: the mean loss ratio among the retained GO Zone 
counties was 0.04% and the maximum was 0.23%, compared to a mean loss ratio of 1.6% 
in the dropped GO Zone counties.  The common support requirement eliminated high 
                                                 
21 Matching with replacement is the only option available with the bias corrected MM estimator provided 
by Abadie, et al. (2004). 
22 In the model using state fixed effects and limiting the analysis to the three GO Zone states, the common 
support requirement dropped 57 GO Zone counties, keeping 38 GO zone counties in the analysis. 17 
 
loss counties because there are no non-GO Zone counties with high enough losses to 
serve as suitable counterfactuals.  Hence, our estimates are not representative of all GO 
Zone counties, but only of GO Zone counties that suffered relatively small losses, and for 
which suitable matching non-GO Zone counties could be identified.  
To test whether our results are biased by unobserved confounding factors, we use 
a test suggested by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), which is a test for significant 
differences in outcomes using pre-program data.  If there are significant differences in 
pre-program trends in outcome variables between the matched groups, it contradicts the 
assumption that the differences in trends observed during the program period are due to 
the program.   
 
Variables and data 
  All variables were measured at the county level.  The outcome variables that we 
investigate include changes in per capita personal income and its major components (net 
earnings; dividends, interest and rent; and transfer payments), per capita employment, 
and population.  We investigate changes from 2004 – the year prior to Hurricanes 
Katrina, Rita and Wilma – to 2008 (the latest year for which data were available when the 
analysis was conducted).  The source of data for these variables is the U.S. Department of 
Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Regional Economic Information 
System. 
  The covariates used in the matching procedures include the value of estimated 
losses due to Hurricane Katrina as a percentage of the value of property (loss ratio); 
whether the county was a metro county; the mean per capita personal income, population 18 
 
and poverty rate in the county in 2000; the share of adults employed in major industries 
(agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting; construction; manufacturing; retail trade); 
Federal economic development grants per capita to the county in 2000 and 2001; the 
population density of the county in 1990; the rural and farm shares of the population in 
2000; the shares of the population that are Black, children and elderly; the share of the 
adult population with greater than a high school education; and the shares of men and of 
women who worked full time all year in 1999.  Except for the loss ratio, all of these 
variables were used in a recent analysis of the economic impacts of the Delta Regional 
Authority, a regional economic development program operating in the Mississippi Delta 
region (Pender and Reeder 2011), and many have been used in previous analyses of 
economic impacts of development programs or other interventions (e.g., Isserman and 
Rephann 1995; Stenberg, et al. 2009).  These variables represent socio-economic and 
demographic factors hypothesized to vary between GO Zone and non-GO Zone counties 
and that can affect the outcome variables. 
  The source of data on loss ratios is the Hazus model developed by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/hazus/).  
Hazus is a risk assessment tool for analyzing losses from floods, hurricane winds, and 
earthquakes.  The software can be used to estimate physical damage to homes, 
businesses, public buildings, and infrastructure.  It can also be used to estimate other 
losses, such as the loss of employment, and other economic losses. We used county level 
estimates of losses resulting from Hurricane Katrina provided by FEMA, estimated as the 
sum of the capital stock losses (i.e., building + contents + inventory losses) multiplied by 
100 and divided by the sum of the building replacement values. 19 
 
  The sources of the other covariates are discussed in detail in Pender and Reeder 
(2011), and include the 2000 Population Census (for almost all of the covariates) and the 
Consolidated Federal Funds Report (for Federal Economic Development grants), and 




Performance of the matching estimators 
  The matched set of GO Zone and non-GO Zone counties, using the PSM model 
and all counties in six States (AL, LA, MS, AR, GA, TN) are shown in Figure 2.  The 
mean characteristics of the unmatched and matched set of counties using this model are 
reported in Table 2.  The unmatched GO Zone counties are statistically significantly 
different from other counties in these States in many respects:  on average they suffered 
higher losses from Hurricane Katrina; had lower personal income per capita and a higher 
poverty rate in 2000; had a smaller share of adults employed in manufacturing, a smaller 
farm share of the population, a larger Black share of the population, a larger child share 
of the population, a smaller elderly share of the population, and a larger share of adults 
with more than a high school education in 2000; and smaller shares of men and women 
who worked full time all year in 1999.  Except for having more educated adults and 
fewer elderly, most of these differences reflect factors associated with lower incomes and 
greater poverty in the GO Zone counties than other counties in these States. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 AND TABLE 2 HERE] 20 
 
  By contrast, there are no statistically significant differences between the covariate 
means of the matched samples for any covariates, and the magnitude of the differences 
are in most cases fairly small, using the PSM model for counties in all six States.  The 
largest remaining differences in the matched samples (measured by the absolute value of 
the percentage difference in means greater than 10%) are in the loss ratio; the population 
level in 2000; the share of adults employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting; 
population density.  A global balance test of this PSM model, which tests the fit and 
significance of a probit model for the matched sample, indicates that the pseudo R
2 for 
the matched sample is low (0.111) and the significance level of the set of covariates in 
that model is high (0.827), both of which indicate good performance of the matching 
procedure (Table 3).
23   
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
  In the three State PSM model with State fixed effects, the matching does not 
perform as well, but still achieves a reasonably good balance for most covariates.  The 
only statistically significant difference between the covariate means for the matched 
groups is for the loss ratio, which is 0.044 for the matched GO Zone counties and 0.016 
for the matched non-GO Zone counties, a somewhat larger difference than occurs with 
the six State PSM model, and statistically significant at the 0.053 level.  The global test 
also indicates poorer matching performance of this restricted model, with a larger pseudo 
R
2 (0.226) and smaller significance level (0.303) for the joint significance test of the 
covariates in the matched sample.  Still, the restricted model achieves reasonably good 
balance according to this global test. 
                                                 
23 If the model achieved perfect matching, the pseudo R
2 would equal 0 and the significance level of the 
covariates would equal 1.0 for the probit model on the matched sample.   21 
 
  The MM model (used with the six State sample) performs the worst in achieving 
good matches.  There are statistically significant differences between the mean values of 
several covariates for the matched samples in this case, including differences in the Black 
share, the child share, and the elderly share of the population (all significant at the 5% 
level or less).  The global balance test also indicates poorer matching, with a higher 
pseudo R
2 and joint statistical significance of the covariates in the probit model on the 
matched sample (Table 3).  Given the poorer matching performance of the MM 
estimator, it is especially important to correct for bias with this estimator, as we do using 
the estimator of Abadie et al. (2004). 
Differences in outcomes 
  The mean differences in the outcome variables between the matched set of GO 
Zone and non-GO Zone counties are reported in Table 4 for each of the matching models.  
All three models find that the mean growth in per capita personal income from 2004 to 
2008 was statistically significantly greater in the matched GO Zone counties than in the 
matched non-GO Zone counties (significance at the 10% level in the two PSM models 
and at the 5% level in the MM model).  The mean difference in growth was about $1,000 
per capita in the two PSM models and more than $1,200 per capita in the MM model. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
  We investigated the timing of the impact on growth in per capita incomes by 
investigating the differences in growth from 2004 to 2005, 2006 and 2007.  We find 
statistically insignificant differences in all cases, although the results from all models 
suggest greater growth began to be achieved by 2006, although the impact was not 
measurable with statistical confidence until 2008.  Given the statistical insignificance of 22 
 
the differences in personal income per capita in prior years, we did not investigate the 
similar time pattern of other outcome variables, for which impacts through 2008 were 
less statistically significant or insignificant. 
  We find weakly statistically significant difference in growth in net earnings per 
capita (at the 10 percent level) using two of the matching models (PSM and MM with the 
six State sample).  The difference is somewhat smaller and with a larger standard error in 
the restricted PSM model, so is statistically insignificant.  Nevertheless, in all three 
models, the estimated impact is positive and in the range of about $750 to $900 of 
additional growth in net earnings per capita in GO Zone counties. 
  We also find some evidence of more rapid growth in dividends, interest and rent 
in GO Zone counties.  Across the three models, the estimated impact is in the range of 
$250 to $500 of additional growth in property income, although the estimated impact is 
statistically significant only in the MM model.  Similarly, we find some evidence of more 
rapid growth in employment per capita in GO Zone counties, though again the estimate is 
statistically significant only in the MM model.  And finally, we find statistically 
insignificant differences between GO Zone counties and matched non-GO Zone counties 
in changes in transfer payments per capita and in population, using all three models. 
  As noted previously, we investigated whether there were differences in growth 
rates of these outcome variables between the matched sets of counties prior to 2005, and 
these results are also reported in Table 4.  In almost all cases, the differences in prior 
growth of the outcome variables were statistically insignificant.  The change in per capita 
dividends, interest and rent from 2000 to 2004 was significantly less in the GO Zone 
counties according to two of the models (PSM and MM using all six states), which is in 23 
 
the opposite direction of the changes from 2004 to 2008.  Hence, we have no evidence 
that a continuation of prior differences in growth trends would explain any of the results 
for changes from 2004 to 2008. 
 
Conclusion 
  Personal income per capita grew about $1,000 faster from 2004 to 2008 in GO 
Zone counties than in matched non-GO zone counties having similar losses from 
Hurricane Katrina and similar socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.  This 
finding was robust whether we included all counties in the GO Zone States and three 
neighboring States in the analysis, or limited the analysis to only counties in the GO Zone 
States.  It was also robust to the method used for matching, with an even larger impact 
estimated using the MM estimator with bias correction. Differences in income growth 
prior to 2005 indicate that these results were not due to a continuation of differences in 
prior trends. 
  The main sources of increased growth in personal income in GO Zone counties 
appear to be more rapid growth in net earnings and property income.  These results are 
less robust than the impacts on total personal income per capita, however, because the 
impacts are smaller and hence more difficult to measure.  Consistent with the growth in 
earnings, we find some evidence of increased employment per capita in GO Zone 
counties, although this is not robust across estimators.  We find no statistically significant 
difference between GO Zone counties and matched non-GO zone counties in changes in 
transfer payments or population. 24 
 
  Several of the provisions of GOZA may have accounted for the difference in the 
growth rate of per-capita income and one of its component, earnings, particularly the 
provisions that were wage subsidies.  The WOTC—the credit offered to employers who 
hire employees living in the GO Zone—was effective through August 27, 2009, though 
the employee retention credit lasted through 2005 only.  The GO Zone WOTC provision 
did not require the taxpayer to have suffered an economic loss, but rather eligibility was 
only contingent on residing in the covered area.  Limited past research on the WOTC 
(and Welfare-to-Work) suggests that certification as a WOTC/WtW worker could result 
in greater earnings.  Hamersma (2008) found the incidence of the credit at least partly 
accrued to WOTC-certified workers.  It was reported they had an increase in their 
quarterly earnings of $105, which is about close to a 9% premium, over similar workers 
who were not certified, though earnings gains were short-lived.  Hence it is plausible that 
this provision could have influenced earnings and income in GO Zone counties that 
suffered small losses from Katrina.   
  Other provisions, such as tax-exempt bond financing and increased cost-recovery 
incentives may have contributed to the earnings growth through spurred investment in the 
GO Zone, but the mechanism is not clear.  In fact, economic theory suggests lowering the 
cost of capital would result in substitution away from labor, which is consistent with our 
finding of limited effect on employment growth.  To date, studies of similar programs, 
particularly ―enterprise zones,‖ have provided mixed results to support the stylized 
hypothesis that tax advantages for capital investment induce employment growth (Peters 
and Fisher 2002).  Enterprise zones, whether Federal or State, are geographically-targeted 
economic development zone that largely rely on tax incentives to promote employment 25 
 
growth, community investment, and improve the economic circumstances of zone 
residents.  A recent and notably robust study by Neumark and Kolko (2010) estimate the 
impact of California‘s enterprise zone program on the employment, and they fail to find 
an effect on employment within the zones relative to control groups.   
  Such provisions may have affected property income, such as rental income, by 
affecting property values.  Hanson (2008) and Krupka and Noonan (2009) suggest 
geographically-targeted tax incentives might be capitalized into property values.  Our 
finding (though statistically significant using only one estimator) that growth in property 
income was greater in GO Zone counties than matched non-GO Zone counties is 
consistent with this.  Further research using data on property values is needed to more 
definitively test this possible mechanism of impact, however. 
Because KETRA and GOZA incorporated many moving pieces of law, it is not 
possible to isolate the impacts of their specific provisions on the outcomes that we 
investigate.  This study is only able to identify differences in income and employment 
growth between counties in the GO Zone and similar counties outside of that zone, and 
rule out a few alternative hypotheses for these results, such as the effects of State-specific 
policies or contexts, or the effects of the matching method.  Although we have suggested 
some plausible hypotheses about mechanisms through which these policies may have led 
to these impacts, investigation of these hypotheses is beyond the scope of this study, and 
further research on this topic is needed and warranted. 26 
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Figure 1. The Hurricane Katrina Disaster Area and the Gulf Opportunity Zone (GO Zone) 
Source: IRS designations (IRS 2006). 




Figure 2.  Matched GO Zone and non-GO Zone Counties 
Source:  Propensity score matching (PSM) analysis by the authors 
 
   Table 1. Major provisions of KETRA and GOZA 
Provision   Law Establishing Provision  Covered Area  Additional Eligibility Rules  Sunset 
Employment, Housing, 
Income Support 
       
Employee Retention 
Credit 
KETRA  GO Zone  Inoperable business due to 
Katrina 
12/31/06 
Work Opportunity Tax 
Credit 
KETRA  GO Zone  Employee resided and was 
hired in the GO Zone, or was 




from retirement plans 
KETRA  Katrina Disaster Area  Sustained economic loss due 
to Katrina 
1/1/07 
Look-back rule for 
EITC/Child Tax Credit  
KETRA  GO Zone or Katrina Disaster 
Area 
Resided in GO Zone or 
displace from Katrina 
Disaster Area 
Tax Year 2005 
Suspension of certain 
limits on casualty losses 
KETRA  Katrina Disaster Area  Casualty loss due to Katrina  n.a. 
Extended period of 
replacement for non-
recognition of gain 
KETRA  Katrina Disaster Area  Compulsory or involuntary 
conversion due to Katrina 
n.a. 
         
Tax-advantaged Financing         
Tax-exempt private 
activity bond financing 
GOZA  GO Zone  Eligible projects must meet 
various rules regarding 
―public purpose‖ test 
12/31/11 




         
Investment Incentives         
Increased expensing of 
GO Zone property 
GOZA  GO Zone  Placed in service in the GO 




GOZA  GO Zone  Placed in service in the GO 
Zone on or after 8/28/05 
12/31/08 1 
 
Increase in New Markets  
Tax Credit for 
development of GO Zone 
GOZA  GO Zone  Investments must be made in 
GO Zone 
12/31/07 
         
Other Recovery Efforts         
Increased expensing of 
certain demolition and 
clean-up costs 
GOZA  GO Zone  Economic loss due to Katrina  12/31/07 
Extension of expensing of 
environmental 
remediation costs 
GOZA  GO Zone  Economic loss due to Katrina  12/31/07 
Increased expensing of 
timber  reforestation 
GOZA  GO Zone  Economic loss due to Katrina  12/31/07 
Extended net operating 
loss carryback period (5 
year) for certain amounts 
related to Hurricane 
Katrina 
GOZA  GO Zone  Economic loss, depreciation, 
or certain repair or moving 
expenses due to Katrina 
12/31/07 
Notes:  
a. Displaced workers were only covered until 12/31/05. 
b. Financed home improvements must improve residence‘s basic livability or energy efficiency. 2 
 







counties  t statistic  p>|t| 
Metro county (share) 
 
U  0.389  0.365  0.45  0.653 
M  0.372  0.372  0.00  1.000 
Loss ratio (%) 
 
U  0.927  0.004  9.10  0.000*** 
M  0.037  0.018  1.61  0.111 
Per capita personal income in 2000 ($) 
 
U  19955  21021  -2.40  0.017** 
M  19730  20627  -0.82  0.417 
Population in 2000 
 
U  64123  48549  1.52  0.130 
M  58728  72006  -0.48  0.631 
Poverty rate in 2000 (%) 
 
U  19.0  16.7  3.83  0.000*** 
M  19.7  20.6  -0.60  0.550 
Adults employed in agriculture, forestry, 
fisheries & hunting (share)  
U  0.037  0.040  -0.76  0.445 
M  0.040  0.047  -0.85  0.396 
Adults employed in construction (share) 
 
U  0.086  0.082  1.16  0.245 
M  0.080  0.073  1.63  0.108 
Adults employed in manufacturing (share)  U  0.168  0.224  -6.25  0.000*** 
M  0.156  0.145  0.70  0.487 
Adults employed in retail trade (share) 
 
U  0.116  0.115  0.32  0.748 
M  0.115  0.113  0.75  0.454 
Economic development grants per capita in 
2000-2001 ($) 
U  331.9  319.2  0.22  0.822 
M  378.5  370.1  0.10  0.924 
Population density in 1990 (persons/sq. 
mile) 
U  114.9  88.2  1.25  0.211 
M  88.0  99.1  -0.30  0.763 
Rural share of population (share) 
 
U  0.616  0.661  -1.50  0.134 
M  0.584  0.557  0.45  0.654 
Farm share of population (share) 
 
U  0.020  0.026  -2.46  0.014** 
M  0.017  0.017  0.05  0.962 
Black share of population (share)  
 
U  0.357  0.222  6.16  0.000*** 
M  0.394  0.419  -0.57  0.569 
Children share of population  (share) 
 
U  0.275  0.257  6.73  0.000*** 
M  0.277  0.277  0.06  0.956 
Elderly share of population (share) 
 
U  0.124  0.135  -3.26  0.001*** 
M  0.122  0.121  0.11  0.915 
Share of adult population with more than 
high school education (share) 
U  0.369  0.347  2.13  0.033** 
M  0.357  0.382  -1.08  0.282 
Share of men working full time all year in 
1999 
U  0.588  0.619  -4.12  0.000*** 
M  0.575  0.575  -0.04  0.966 
Share of women working full time all year 
in 1999 
U  0.403  0.434  -6.12  0.000*** 
M  0.402  0.406  -0.42  0.675 
Notes:*, **, *** indicate difference is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
a.‘U‘ represents unmatched sample; ‗M‘ represents matched sample. 3 
 
 
Table 3.  Global balance test of unmatched and matched samples of counties in matching models 
  PSM with  
six State sample 
PSM with three State sample  
and State fixed effects 
MM with  
six State sample 
Sample  Pseudo R
2  LR χ
2  p > χ
2  Pseudo R
2  LR χ
2  p > χ
2  Pseudo R
2  LR χ
2  p > χ
2 
Unmatched  0.749  375.87  0.000***  0.711  206.37  0.000***  0.749  375.87  0.000*** 
Matched  0.111  13.21  0.827  0.226  23.80  0.303  0.295  35.19  0.013** 
*, **, *** indicate difference is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
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Table 4.  Average effect of GO Zone Designation on Change in Outcome Measures, using 
different methods 
Outcome measure  Time period  PSM – all six 
states 
PSM – with state fixed 
effects (only GO zone 
states) 
MM with bias 
correction 
Change in per capita 
personal income ($) 






























Change in per capita net 
earnings ($) 












Change in per capita 
dividends, interest and 
rent ($)  












Change in per capita 
transfer payments ($) 












Change in per capita 
employment 
























*, **, *** indicate difference is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
 
 